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Internal control is a branch of accounting subject, and accounting control and risk
management are the core of enterprise internal control. Previous studies have shown
that high-quality internal control inhibits or regulates managerial overconfidence (MOC).
However, it is believed that the influential factors of internal-control quality (ICQ) are
normally objective factors, such as corporate characteristics, financial status, and
governance structure. Corresponding to another type of constituent element, that is, the
subjective factor, which we called internal-control willingness, has not been explored.
In this study, we defined internal-control willingness as the degrees of the subjective
initiative of the internal-control construction and execution activities of enterprises. In
addition, we proposed a method to measure internal-control willingness based on
text analysis and principal component analysis using Python, and then, we tested its
impact on ICQ and MOC. Our findings are as follows: (A) internal-control willingness
has a positive impact on ICQ, and (B) internal-control willingness lowers MOC. Our
study introduces subjective initiative factors into the field of internal control and also
extends the understanding of internal-control theory. Based on empirical conclusions,
we suggested that regulatory authorities and corporate boards improve incentive
mechanisms to jointly strengthen the internal-control willingness of all employees, so
as to help enterprise managers operate rationally.
Keywords: willingness, managerial overconfidence, internal-control quality, internal-control willingness,
internal control
INTRODUCTION
Internal control is a branch of accounting subject, and accounting control and risk management
are the core of enterprise internal control (COSO, 1992, 2004; Sarbanes and Oxley, 2002). At the
same time, Willingness, as a term in psychology, is mainly used in the field of economics to measure
the degree of the subjective will of actors, such as willingness to disclose financial information and
willingness to pay (Hanemann, 1991; Elliott et al., 2014). Internal-control willingness, according
to the psychological definition of willingness and its application in the accounting field, proposed
in this study, is to measure the degrees of the subjective initiative of internal-control activities
of enterprises. This subjective initiative, specifically, is the collective willingness of governance,
management, and all employees (COSO, 1992; Ministry of Finance of China, 2008).
Does internal-control willingness matter? Ever since there has been any business firm, there
has been internal control, which arises from the willingness of a business to engage in internal
control so that it can succeed in the marketplace (Krishnan, 2005). As can be reasonably expected,
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this internal-control willingness varies from firm to firm. The
importance of internal-control willingness and its variations are
apparent even after many rules and regulations are codified
(Ministry of Finance of China, 2008; COSO, 2013, 2017).
For example, although the accounting rules and regulations
governing all US firms are the same, Enron committed extremely
serious mistakes (Deakin and Konzelmann, 2004). Thus, it
must be that Enron had a different degree of internal-
control willingness than other firms, which led to managerial
overconfidence (MOC) and deliberately deviating from internal-
control supervision.
Although internal-control willingness is important, it is
difficult to observe. It is the reason why the studies in this
field are almost blank. In traditional cognition, it is believed
that the influential factors of internal-control quality (ICQ)
are normally objective factors, such as corporate characteristics,
financial status, and governance structure (Ashbaugh-Skaife
et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2007). The subjective initiative of internal
control, that is, the internal-control willingness, has been ignored.
Therefore, it is still necessary to explore whether the internal-
control willingness of enterprises can affect MOC.
Our first contribution in this study is to introduce a
methodology that quantifies internal-control willingness based
on text analysis and principal component analysis (PCA) using
Python. Empirical evidence shows that the internal-control
willingness we designed has a positive impact on ICQ. Our
second contribution is to show that, consistent with theoretical
predictions, the internal-control willingness of enterprise lowers
MOC. Our study introduces subjective initiative factors into the
field of internal control and also extends the understanding of
internal-control theory.
This study proceeds as follows. “Theoretical basis, literature
review, and research hypotheses” section reviews previous
literature, elaborates on the theoretical analysis, and develops
research hypotheses. “Research design, variables, and data
sources” section describes the research design, variables, and
data sources. “Empirical results and analysis” section reports
and analyzes empirical results. “Robustness tests” section reports
various robustness checks. “Conclusion and discussion” section
presents the conclusion and research implications.
THEORETICAL BASIS, LITERATURE
REVIEW, AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Theoretical Basis and Literature Review
Internal control is a branch of accounting subject, which is
based on financial internal control. The earliest professional
document involving “internal control” was the “Verification of
Financial Statements” issued by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB)
in 1929. In addition, the earliest definition of “internal control”
was the “Examination of Financial Statements by Independent
Public Accountants” issued in 1936. The U.S. COSO reports
(COSO, 1992, 2004, 2013, 2017) are the pioneer of internal-
control theory and are recognized by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) and the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
In the field of practice, the “World Communications”
accounting scandal in June 2002 completely dampened the
confidence of investors in the capital market. To change this
situation, the U.S. Congress and the government accelerated the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX Act). An important
innovation of the SOX Act is that companies listed in the U.S.
stock market need to separately disclose the annual internal-
control evaluation report and the internal-control audit report
while disclosing the annual financial report and audit report.
This bill highlights the important role of internal control in
enterprise risk management. Since then, regulatory agencies
around the world have drawn lessons from the U.S. COSO
report and SOX Act to formulate internal-control systems and
action plans applicable to each country, such as “Corporate
Internal Control Basic Standards in China” (2008) and “Main
Board Listed Companies Implement Corporate Internal-Control
Standard System in Batches by Classification” in China (2012).
The U.S. COSO reports (COSO, 1992, 2004, 2013, 2017),
the Sarbanes and Oxley (2002), and the Ministry of Finance of
China (2008), all believe that internal control is implemented by
the board of directors, board of supervisors, managers, and all
employees of the company to achieve control goals. In addition,
the goals of internal control are to “reasonably ensure the legality
and compliance of business management, asset safety, financial
reports, and related information that are true and complete,
improve operational efficiency, and promote the realization of
development strategies.”
Internal-control willingness is a variable tool, proposed in
this study, to measure the degree of the subjective initiative of
internal-control construction and execution. Therefore, research
similar to this definition is almost blank. The closest research
to this topic is the research experience on “willingness.” The
“willingness” in applied psychology and behavioral economics is a
variable of subjective initiative that can be measured, for example,
“willing to pay,” and “willing to accept” (Coursey et al., 1987; Plott
and Zeiler, 2005), “consumer willingness” (Lusk, 2003; Phelps
et al., 2013), “Willing to participate” (Evans and Guthrie, 2006;
Füller et al., 2010), etc. At the same time, the subjective initiative
of internal-control construction activities is a verifiable and
objectively existing natural phenomenon of applied psychology.
It can be inferred that “internal-control willingness” is an
accounting tool that can be identified, confirmed, and measured.
In academia, the measurement methods, economic
consequences, and influencing factors of internal control
are the focus of studies of scholars. Among them, the economic
consequences of internal control, such as “firm risk,” “cost of
equity,” “corporate governance,” “corporate cash holdings,” etc.
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Hoitash et al., 2009; Zheng and
Chen, 2018), are of various types, but it is less relevant to our
study. The measurement methods of internal control and the
objective factors affecting ICQ are related to our study.
For one thing, the review of the measurement methods of
internal control helps us to understand the optimal selection
of ICQ. In previous studies, the results of internal control of
a company are mainly reflected by the variable “ICQ” and
measured according to the following methods: (1) internal-
control effectiveness (Zhang et al., 2013; Liu and Wu, 2019). It
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is the final result of the annual internal-control evaluation report
issued by the board of directors of the company. (2) Internal-
control audit conclusion (Huang and Song, 2012; Liu et al., 2021).
It is the verification conclusion given by the accounting firm
on the corporate internal-control evaluation report. (3) Internal-
control defects (Doyle et al., 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.,
2009). It is an indirect content of internal-control information
disclosure, and this type of information is not mandatory in
China. (4) Internal-control index (ICI) (Lin B. et al., 2014; Chen
et al., 2017). It is usually based on the specific content of the
internal-control evaluation report, combined with the content
of the annual financial report or other public information of
the company. The ICI score is obtained by the self-designed
evaluation system, and the advantage is that the score is a fine-
grained measurement. In short, the first two methods belong to
the direct evaluation of ICQ, and the data are derived from direct
conclusions of the corporate official internal-control evaluation
report or audit report. The latter two methods are indirect
or derivative evaluations, and there is a lack of information
on internal-control defects or doubts about the credibility of
the index design.
For another, the review of objective factors affecting ICQ helps
us to select control factors in model design. Since Doyle et al.
(2007) explored the determinants of ICQ, scholars have focused
on the objectively formed factors that affect ICQ, including first,
corporate characteristics and financial status affect ICQ, which
is manifested as enterprises with large scale, long creation times,
and low financial risk have good objective resource advantages to
achieve high ICQ (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Michelon et al.,
2015). Second, the governance structure of the board of directors
and audit committees affects ICQ, which is reflected in board size,
ratio of independent directors, and performance of supervisors
(Krishnan, 2005; Chalmers et al., 2019). Third, characteristics of
corporate management, such as CEO and CFO, affect ICQ which
is manifested in the factors such as professionalism, background,
and rights (Hoitash et al., 2009; Lin Y. C. et al., 2014). In
addition, some factors that come from outside of companies affect
ICQ but have national differences or data limitations, such as
characteristics of external auditors, national culture, regulatory,
and market factors (Sarens and Christopher, 2010; Chen et al.,
2016; Kanagaretnam et al., 2016).
In summary, in the field of economics, “willingness” is an
instrumental variable that can be confirmed and measured.
However, the study on “internal-control willingness” is in the
ascendant. At the same time, the study of “internal-control
willingness” on managerial confidence has not been carried out.
The study contents above need to be demonstrated.
Theoretical Analysis and Research
Hypotheses
Before any formal regulation was mandated by any authority,
businesses always had their own internal-control systems.
Businesses are willing to voluntarily impose on themselves an
internal-control system because it helps them succeed in the
competitive marketplace (Krishnan, 2005). While this internal-
control willingness has existed since the beginning of the existence
of business, codified rules and regulations for internal control are
only a recent phenomenon.
The U.S. COSO reports (COSO, 1992, 2004, 2013, 2017), the
Sarbanes and Oxley (2002), and the Ministry of Finance of China
(2008), all stated that the goals of the internal-control act include
but are not limited to the following five aspects: “reasonably
ensure the legality and compliance of business operation and
management,” “ensure asset security,” “financial reports and
related information are true and complete,” “improve operating
efficiency and effectiveness,” and “promote the realization of
development strategies for enterprises.”
The realization of the above goals depends on the dominant
position of the board of directors in internal-control construction
and also on the collective “willingness” of governance,
management, and all employees. In addition, the collective
“willingness” is based on the fact that internal control is a process
implemented by the board of directors, board of supervisors,
managers, and all employees to achieve internal-control goals
(COSO, 1992; Ministry of Finance of China, 2008). The result
of the realization of corporate internal-control goals is to
be a success in the competitive marketplace and realize the
development strategies. Therefore, there are the following logical
chains among internal-control goals, subjective willingness, and
final result of internal control (ICQ). Logically, internal-control
willingness and ICQ have consistent goals. Thus, before proving
the economic consequences of internal-control willingness, we
first need to clarify the relationship between internal-control
willingness and ICQ. We proposed a basic hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Internal-control willingness has a
positive impact on ICQ.
The notion of MOC (or optimism) is based on a stylized
fact in social psychology known as the “better than average”
effect (Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein and Klein, 1996; Ahmed and
Duellman, 2013). Specifically, on the one hand, the first type
of MOC is that managers (including directors, executives, and
supervisors) systematically overestimate corporate returns or
underestimate corporate risks, causing their behavior decisions
to deviate from corporate returns (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier
and Tate, 2005). On the other hand, the second type of MOC
is that managers are in a position of salary advantage, which
triggers their blind psychological self-confidence, causing their
behavior decisions to deviate from corporate returns (Hayward
and Hambrick, 1997; Brown and Sarma, 2007). It can be said
that the measurement methods of MOC in existing studies can
be included in the categories above.
The U.S. COSO reports (COSO, 1992, 2004, 2013,
2017), the Sarbanes and Oxley (2002), and the Ministry of
Finance of China (2008), all have established five elements of
“internal environment,” “risk assessment,” “control activities,”
“information and communication,” and “internal supervision.”
Among them, based on the first type of MOC, the internal-
control system of enterprises relies on the “risk assessment”
element to accurately identify internal and external risks, which
is related to the realization of goals of the internal-control
act. Meanwhile, the internal-control system of enterprises also
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analyzes and ranks the identified risks according to occurrence
probability and comprehensive uses of risk response strategies,
such as “risk aversion,” “risk reduction,” “risk sharing,” and “risk
tolerance,” to achieve effective risk control. Then, all employees
of enterprises actively construct a “risk assessment” system,
help management face up to business risks, and prompt its
behavioral decisions to conform to the goals of “asset security”
and “improving operating efficiency and effectiveness” in the
internal-control act. In other words, the active internal-control
willingness of enterprises can help avoid the first type of MOC.
In addition, based on the second type of MOC, the internal-
control system of enterprises relies on the “control activity”
and “internal supervision” elements to restraint management
decision-making authority and business behavior, through
“authorization approval control,” “budget control,” “performance
appraisal control,” “daily supervision,” and “special supervision.”
Then, all employees of enterprises actively construct a “control
activity” and “internal supervision” system, help management
make reasonable decisions, compliant operations, and rational
decisions, and promote their behavioral decisions to comply
with the goals of “reasonably ensure the legality and compliance
of business operation and management” and “promote the
realization of development strategies for enterprises.” In other
words, the active internal-control willingness of enterprises can
help avoid the second type of MOC. Therefore, logically, internal-
control willingness is negatively correlated with MOC. Therefore,
this study proposes the second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Internal-control willingness lowers MOC.




Internal-control willingness is a tool, proposed in this study, to
measure the degrees of the subjective initiative of internal-control
activities of enterprises. To this end, we proposed the following
technical route for measurement:
First, we found out voluntary pilot companies of internal
control in all samples. In addition, those companies that
voluntarily take the lead in the building internal-control system
are most likely to have “positive” internal-control willingness. At
the same time, its observation medium is the annual “Enterprise
Internal-Control Self-Evaluation Report” (EICSER) approved
and issued by corporate boards. Specifically, for our research,
in the period of 2011–2016, we found out 188 enterprises that
may have the “key features” (KFs) of “positive” internal-control
willingness and a subtotal of 976 samples of annual EICSERs from
the 6,386 overall research samples.
Second, we used the method of intelligent text analysis using
Python to explore the KFs of positive internal-control willingness
on the 976 samples of annual EICSERs above. We drew on
the concept of Loughran and McDonald (2011) on English
sentiment vocabulary classification, referred to the Chinese
dictionary of “News Quantitative Public Opinion Database”
in the CSMAR database (China Stock Market & Accounting
Research Databases), and then identify the KFs in annual
EICSERs that are related to “positive” internal-control willingness
by means of manual labelings, such as “effective execution,”
“increase value,” “sense of duty,” etc. Then, we aggregated a total
of 45 groups of KFs and form a “bag of words” (BOW).
Third, we used the KF variables in the BOW, based on
the “Traversal” function of Python, to obtain its statistical
probabilities, and construct a word frequency matrix for text
vectorization. Later, based on PCA using Python, we built
an unsupervised PCA training algorithm model to carry out
data dimensionality reduction on the contents of each EICSER.
Specifically, we used the 45-dimensional data of the KFs in
the BOW into 8-dimensional principal component data (f1,. . .,
f8) through “dimensionality reduction” to achieve a cumulative
contribution rate of 82.89% (>70%).
Fourth, we further calculated the “comprehensive value”
(Score) of the text content of each EICSER and then, standardized
the deviation of its value to map it to the [0, 1]. In the end,
we achieved the measurement of the internal-control willingness
value, which is marked as the variable ICW.
Measurement of Managerial
Overconfidence
This study draws on the following three methods to measure
MOC from the following different perspectives:
The first method, based on the idea of Malmendier
and Tate (2005), uses the relationship between managerial
shareholding changes and year-end performance to measure
MOC. Specifically, we used virtual variables: if managers
accumulatively increase their shareholdings (total shareholding
changes of directors, supervisors, and senior executives) and
year-end net profit of a company is a loss or less than the value
of the previous year, it is deemed that managers of the company
are overconfident. In this case, the value is 1, and the others are 0.
This variable is labeled as MOC1.
The second method, based on the idea of Hayward
and Hambrick (1997), uses the relative ratio of managerial
compensation to measure MOC. Hayward and Hambrick (1997)
believed that the salary ratio of the highest managerial salary to
the second, or the salary ratio of the top three managers to all
managers, can measure MOC. Moreover, the greater the ratio, the
greater the degree of MOC (Brown and Sarma, 2007). Specifically,
for this study, we used the salary ratio of the top three managers
to all managers, which is recorded as MOC2.
The third method, based on the method of Lin et al.
(2005), uses the deviation degree between performance forecast
and actual value to measure MOC. Lin et al. (2005) believed
that the performance forecast of the financial report indicates
managerial confidence. In addition, the difference between
performance forecast and formal financial report can measure
MOC. The greater the positive value of this difference, the greater
the degree of MOC. Specifically for this study, we used the
difference between the net profit of performance forecast and
net profit disclosed in the actual financial report, and record it
as MOC3.
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Metric content Variable description or calculation method
Explained
variable (MOC)
MOC1 Managerial overconfidence Virtual variable: if managers accumulatively increase their shareholdings, and year-end net profit of a
company is a loss or less than the value of the previous year, the value is 1, and others are 0.
MOC2 Position of salary advantage, that is, the salary ratio of the top three managers to all managers.
MOC3 Deviation degree of managers’ operating results, that is, the difference between net profit of
performance forecast and net profit disclosed in actual financial report.
Explanatory
variable
ICW Internal-control willingness Use text analysis and principal component analysis (PCA) by Python as measurement method, and





Virtual variable: internal control is effective as 1, and the others are as 0.
ICA Internal-control audit
conclusion
Virtual variable: standard unqualified opinion is as 1, and the others are 0.
ICI Internal-control index Refer to the “Internal-control Index” of the DIB database.
Control
variables
Size Corporate size Natural logarithm of average total assets
ROID Ratio of independent
director
The ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of board members
MS Managerial shareholding The sum of shareholding ratio of managers (directors, supervisors, and senior executives).
Lev Financial leverage Financial leverage = total corporate debt/total assets
BS Board size Natural logarithm of total number of directors
Edu Average educational level of
managers
The mean value of managers’ academic qualifications. Among them, 1 for high school and below, 2
for junior college, 3 for undergraduate, 4 for master, and 5 for doctoral degree.
PB Average professional
background of managers
The mean value of managers related to risk management. Among them, a manager is a risk
management-related major, the value is 1, and others are 0.
Ind Industry Primary industry classification
Year Year Year value
Main Test Models
The regression models of this study are based on the control
factors confirmed by scholars in the field of influencing factors
of internal control (Doyle et al., 2007; Hoitash et al., 2009)
and influencing factors of MOC (Lang and Lundholm, 1996;
Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Brown and Sarma, 2007; Ahmed and
Duellman, 2013), refer to models (1) and (2) and Table 1 for
details. ICE, ICA, and ICI represent one of the three measurement
methods for ICQ. MOC1, MOC2, and MOC3 represent one of
the three measurement methods for MOC. ICW represents the
internal-control willingness of enterprises.
ICQit = α0 + α1ICWit + α2Sizeit + α3ROIDit + α4MSit
+ α5Levit +α6BSit + αIndIndit + αYearYearit + εit (1)
MOCit = β0 + β1ICWit + β2Sizeit + β3ROIDit + β4MSit
+ β5Eduit +β6PBit + βIndIndit + βYearYearit + εit (2)
Research Samples and Data Sources
Our study uses China A-share main board listed companies as
research samples. The Guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control,
jointly issued by the China Ministry of Finance and the China
Securities Regulatory Commission in 2010, stipulates that the
Guidelines for Internal Control Evaluation of Enterprises and
Guidelines for Internal Control Audit of Enterprises shall be
implemented on the main board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from January 1, 2012. Therefore,
we selected the data of internal-control self-evaluation reports,
annual financial reports, and audit report information from 2011
to 2016 as data sources.
At the same time, the samples are selected according to the
following rules: (a) exclude financial and insurance companies
since the financial statements of such listed companies have a
special structure. (b) Exclude samples with data defects to ensure
comparability. The data sources of this study include the Wind,
CSMAR, DIB, Juchao Information, Shanghai, and Shenzhen
Stock Exchange websites.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics. First, the mean value
of the explanatory variable ICW is 0.38, which is between the
median and the P75. It shows that from 2011 to 2016, only a
small number of listed companies have strong internal-control
subjective initiative. Second, among the explanatory variables,
the mean value of the MOC1 is 0.08, which shows that, in only
8% of the sample companies, managers accumulatively increase
their shareholdings (the total shareholding changes of directors,
supervisors, and senior management), and year-end net profit
of the company is a loss or less than the value of the previous
year. From this perspective, there are few companies whose
managers are overconfident. Third, the mean value of MOC2 is
0.44 and is close to the median value of 0.41, which shows that
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics results.
Stats N Mean SD Min P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Max
MOC1 6386 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
MOC2 6386 0.44 0.14 0.00 0.28 0.34 0.41 0.51 0.63 1.00
MOC3 3058# –2.36 4250.51 –12664.10 –114.76 –22.28 –4.95 6.49 71.72 121563.00
ICW 6386 0.38 0.18 0.00 0.13 0.23 0.29 0.56 0.89 1.00
ICE 6386 0.80 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ICA 6386 0.77 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ICI 6386 638.13 163.59 0.00 541.95 618.04 672.08 711.60 750.93 995.36
Size 6386 22.60 1.45 17.76 20.88 21.66 22.44 23.42 24.51 28.51
ROID 6386 0.37 0.06 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.43 0.80
MS 6386 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.62
Lev 6386 52.01 20.13 0.71 24.20 37.34 52.94 67.74 77.84 103.73
BS 6386 2.18 0.21 0.00 1.95 2.08 2.20 2.20 2.40 2.89
Edu 6386 3.29 0.66 1.60 2.00 3.00 3.36 3.78 4.00 4.75
PB 6386 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.27 0.60
# It should be noted that in the full sample of 6,386 companies, only 3,058 samples of companies disclosed performance forecasts before the official disclosure of financial
reports. Therefore, the sample size of MOC3 is 3,058.
the total compensation of the top three managers accounts for
40% of the total compensation of all managers in A-share listed
companies of China.
Fourth, the mean and median values of the MOC3 are –2.36
and –4.95, respectively, which are relatively close to 0. At the same
time, the value of the P10–P90 range is [–114.76, 71.72], which
shows that the difference between the net profit of performance
forecast and net profit disclosed in actual financial report is
relatively close for a company, considering that the unit of
measurement is RMB. However, the Min and Max values are –
12664.10 and 121563.00, respectively, which shows that a small
part of the sample has a large prediction bias, and managers are
over self-confident or overconfident. Fifth, the mean values of
the explanatory variables ICE and ICA, as same as comparison
variables of the explained variable, are 0.80 and 0.77, respectively,
indicating that internal-control levels of more than 3/4 listed
companies are of high quality from 2011 to 2016. At the same
time, the mean value of ICIs provided by the third-party DIB
database is 638.13, which is between the P25 and the median. It
shows that most listed companies have relatively high ICIs, only
because some low-scoring companies, such as companies with a
minimum value of “0,” lower the overall internal-control scores
of listed companies.
Basic Regression Analysis of
Internal-Control Willingness on
Internal-Control Quality
Panel A of Table 3 reports the Probit or OLS regression results
among ICW on ICE, ICW on ICA, and ICW on ICI. The
results show that ICW is both positively correlated with ICE,
ICA, and ICI at the 1 or 5% significance level, indicating that
internal-control willingness has a significant positive impact
on ICQ. In detail, the stronger the internal-control willingness
of a company, the higher the probability of “effective” in
internal-control evaluation conclusion, the higher the rate to
obtain “standard unqualified opinion” in internal-control audit
conclusion, the higher the ICI score evaluated by the third-party
organization DIB.
Among the control variables, most of the control factors
related to ICQ are basically consistent with the conclusions of
previous studies, including the following: (A) size is positively
correlated with ICE, ICA, and ICI at the 1% significance level,
similar to the conclusion of Doyle et al. (2007); (B) ROID and
BS are positively correlated with ICE, ICA, and ICI at the 1–
10% significance level, and Lev is negatively correlated with
ICE, ICA, and ICI at the 10 or 1% significance level, similar
to the conclusion of Hoitash et al. (2009); (C) MS is negatively
correlated with ICE, ICA, and ICI at the 1 or 10% significance
level, similar to the conclusion of Balsam et al. (2014).
The basic regression results confirm that internal-control
willingness is an important factor to form the ICQ of a company,
indicating that internal-control willingness, a new accounting
measurement tool, can measure subjective initiative of internal
control. Therefore, we believed that Hypothesis 1 can be accepted.
Regression Analysis of Internal-Control
Willingness on Managerial
Overconfidence
Panel B of Table 3 reports the regression results between ICW
and MOC1 and MOC2 and MOC3, which are three measurement
methods of MOC. The results show that ICW is negatively
correlated with MOC1, MOC2, and MOC3 at 1, 5, or 10%
significance level, indicating that internal-control willingness has
a significant negative impact on MOC.
Among the control variables, most of the control factors
related to MOC are basically consistent with the conclusions of
previous studies, including the following: (A) Size is positively
correlated with MOC at the 1% significance level, indicating that
managers of large enterprises are more likely to be overconfident
(Lang and Lundholm, 1996). (B) ROID is negatively correlated
with MOC at the significance level of 1, 5, or 10%, indicating
that the independent director mechanism can restrain MOC
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TABLE 3 | Regression results.
Panel A (1) (2) (3) Panel B (4) (5) (6)
Variables ICE ICA ICI Variables MOC1 MOC2 MOC3
ICW 0.56*** 0.33*** 12.45** ICW –0.01*** –0.00** –2.65*
(4.12) (3.15) (2.36) (–2.72) (–2.41) (–1.82)
Size 0.27*** 0.25*** 35.39*** Size 0.00*** 0.03*** 16.99***
(10.12) (10.32) (21.72) (2.81) (19.77) (3.05)
ROID 1.19** 0.41* 15.33** ROID –0.04** –0.15*** –160.81*
(2.07) (1.79) (2.32) (–2.35) (–4.64) (–1.82)
MS –0.84*** –0.25* –65.81*** MS 0.01** 0.00*** 90.89*
(–3.01) (–1.77) (–2.89) (2.32) (3.21) (1.73)
Lev –0.00* –0.01*** –1.65*** Edu 0.00*** 0.00*** 5.06*
(–1.85) (–3.78) (–13.11) (3.02) (4.31) (1.87)
BS 0.41*** 1.04** 9.32* PB 0.01** 0.00** 41.01
(2.88) (2.34) (1.79) (2.35) (2.28) (1.34)
Constant –7.89*** –6.32*** –304.70*** Constant 0.02*** 1.01*** 287.32***
(–10.41) (–10.16) (–6.47) (5.10) (23.54) (3.21)
Year & Ind Yes Yes Yes Year & Ind Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,386 6,386 6,386 Observations 6,386 6,386 3,058
Pseudo R2/R2 0.29 0.21 0.12 R2 0.08 0.10 0.06
LR chi2/F 1783.67*** 1521.33*** 32.19*** F 19.03*** 23.43*** 12.99***
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
(Brown and Sarma, 2007). (C) MS is positively correlated with
MOC at the significance level of 1, 5, or 10%, indicating that
managers with a high shareholding ratio are more likely to
produce overconfidence (Jensen, 1993). (D) Edu and PB are
positively correlated with MOC at the significance level of 1, 5, 10,
or close to 10%, indicating that highly educated managers or risk
management professional managers are more likely to produce
overconfidence. In addition, the background characteristics of
managers above have a significant impact on their overconfidence
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier and Tate, 2005).
Therefore, we believed that Hypothesis 2 can be accepted, that
is, internal-control willingness lowers MOC.
Mechanism of Action and Enlightenment
In terms of the economic consequences of internal-control
willingness, on the one hand, the mechanism by which internal-
control willingness of enterprises has a negative impact on MOC
is as follows:
Internal-control willingness is the willingness to construct
and execute an internal-control system, which is one of the
positive constituent factors of a high ICQ. According to
the literature on positive organizational behavior (Luthans,
2002), “positive attitudes and mindsets of organizational actors
→ organizational tendency and behavior → realization of
organizational (performance) goals” is a complete logical
framework. Putting this logical framework in the field of internal
control, the result shows “internal-control (positive) willingness
→ internal-control tendency and behavior → internal-control
results (ICQ).” Thus, both logical and empirical evidence
results indicate that internal-control willingness is an important
component of internal-control results (ICQ).
At the same time, previous studies based on the data of
Chinese listed companies have shown that high ICQ has an
inhibitory or moderating effect on MOC (Xing and Song, 2015;
Zheng and Chen, 2018). Therefore, as an important
component of ICQ, internal-control willingness has a
negative impact on MOC.
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Balanced Panel Data
Due to the limitations in data sources, such as internal-control
regulations and databases, this study adopts the pooled data
method. To enhance the robustness and eliminate the impact of
sample survival choices, this study converts the aforementioned
pooled dataset into a balance panel set, which maintains the
balance of individual samples of cross-section observations from
2011 to 2016. However, the dataset lost 2,696 observations
through the conversion and yielded a new sample set with 3,690
observations. In particular, due to the data source limitation of
the variable MOC3 in Hypothesis 2, its sample size is further
reduced to 1,686 observations.
Columns (1)–(3) of Table 4 report the regression results of
the fixed effect (FE) model after the conversion from the pooled
dataset to the balanced panel dataset. The results show that the
correlation direction and significance of ICW on MOC1, MOC2,
and MOC3 are consistent with the main test. However, due to the
loss of some observations, the significance of ICW in the three
equations has decreased. Therefore, the results above show the
advantage of using pooled data as the main test data.
Sensitivity Test of Different Market Data
Sources
The stock market in China is divided into two parts, namely,
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
The market positioning and service targets of the two exchanges
are slightly different. To verify whether the empirical evidence
obtained by the main tests is affected by different market data
sources, which in turn affects the robustness of the test models
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TABLE 4 | Robustness test results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables MOC1 MOC2 MOC3 MOC1 MOC2 MOC3 MOC1 MOC2 MOC3
ICW –0.01** –0.00* –2.63* –0.01*** –0.00*** –2.66* –0.01** –0.00* –2.23
(–2.12) (–1.89) (–1.77) (–2.89) (–2.71) (–1.90) (–2.03) (–1.88) (–1.51)
Size 0.00*** 0.03*** 14.55* 0.00*** 0.03*** 17.80*** 0.00*** 0.03*** 16.52***
(2.98) (7.76) (1.77) (2.98) (20.15) (3.12) (2.79) (18.98) (2.99)
ROID –0.04* –0.10** –141.32* –0.05** –0.16*** –169.54* –0.04** –0.14*** –157.73*
(–1.72) (–2.38) (–1.78) (–2.40) (–4.87) (–1.86) (–2.31) (–4.25) (–1.83)
MS 0.01* 0.01** 85.51** 0.01** 0.00*** 92.93* 0.01** 0.00*** 89.12*
(1.86) (2.10) (2.31) (2.38) (3.29) (1.79) (2.29) (3.05) (1.71)
Edu 0.00*** 0.00*** 4.67** 0.00*** 0.00*** 4.99* 0.00*** 0.00*** 5.01*
(2.76) (3.22) (2.11) (3.00) (4.01) (1.85) (2.98) (4.23) (1.83)
PB 0.02** 0.00** 27.32 0.01** 0.00** 39.07 0.01** 0.00** 38.67
(2.09) (2.06) (1.22) (2.32) (2.29) (1.30) (2.31) (2.22) (1.30)
Constant 0.03*** 0.76*** 220.19*** 0.03*** 1.12*** 298.10*** 0.02*** 0.98*** 280.12***
(4.25) (15.03) (3.05) (6.01) (24.51) (3.36) (5.02) (22.79) (3.18)
Year & Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,690 3,690 1,686 2,574 2,574 1,223 3,812 3,812 1,835
R2 (between)/R2 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.06
Wald Chi2/F 101.59*** 132.01*** 90.16*** 19.98*** 24.65*** 13.08*** 18.22*** 23.02*** 12.45***
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
and research conclusions, we performed grouping tests on the
two markets. That is, we selected different samples from the
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange and
retested the verified Hypothesis 2.
Columns (4)–(6) of Table 4, respectively, report the OLS
regression results of ICW on MOC1, MOC2, and MOC3 in
the Shenzhen Market group. The correlation direction and
significance of ICW on MOC1, MOC2, and MOC3 are basically
consistent with the main tests. Columns (7)–(9) of Table 4,
respectively, report the OLS regression results of ICW on MOC1,
MOC2, and MOC3 in the Shanghai Market group. Except for the
results of ICW on MOC3 in column (9), which are close to but
not reaching the 10% significance level, the correlation direction
and significance of the other two group results are similar to the
main tests. Therefore, it can be considered that the empirical
evidence obtained by the main tests is basically the same in
different market groups.
In summary, the models and results are basically stable, and
the conclusion of this study is still valid.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Internal-control willingness, proposed in this study, is to
measure the degree of the subjective initiative of internal-control
construction and execution. Meanwhile, we proposed a method
to measure internal-control willingness based on text analysis
and PCA using Python. Moreover, using the internal control and
financial data from 2011 to 2016 in China, we also tested some
effects of internal-control willingness on MOC. We obtained the
following findings:
(A) Internal-control willingness can be identified, confirmed,
and measured. Empirical evidence shows that the
internal-control willingness we designed has a positive
impact on ICQ. In detail, the stronger the internal-control
willingness of a company, the higher the probability of
“effective” in internal-control evaluation conclusion, the
higher the rate to obtain “standard unqualified opinion”
in internal-control audit conclusion, the higher the ICI
score evaluated by the third-party organization DIB.
Therefore, internal-control willingness, a new accounting
measurement tool, can measure subjective initiative of
internal control.
(B) Internal-control willingness lowers MOC. The mechanism
is that internal-control willingness is one of the positive
constituent factors of a high ICQ. Meanwhile, previous
studies based on the data of Chinese listed companies have
shown that high ICQ has an inhibitory or moderating effect
on MOC (Xing and Song, 2015; Zheng and Chen, 2018).
Therefore, as an important component of ICQ, internal-
control willingness has a negative impact on MOC.
Based on empirical conclusions, our study puts forward
the following research implications: subjective initiative
factors play an important role in the construction and
execution of corporate internal control. Therefore, it is
recommended that regulatory authorities should issue favorable
policies, and corporate boards should improve incentive
mechanisms, to jointly guide and strengthen the internal-
control willingness of all corporate employees. The overall
increase of corporate internal-control willingness will help
restrain the overconfidence behavior of individual managers,
help the management face up to the business risks, and help
the management make reasonable, compliant, and rational
decision-making.
At the same time, our research also has some limitations: first,
for the measurement of corporate internal-control willingness,
we adopted a method based on text analysis and PCA.
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Although this method pioneered the measurement of “internal-
control willingness,” other measurement methods still need to
be explored. Second, the economic consequences of “internal-
control willingness” may be numerous, and we only discussed
its impact on MOC. Other economic consequences need to be
discovered in follow-up studies.
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